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 Introduction 
 There has been lively interest in the role of the self and self-experience in depression 
and mood disorders more generally. Vulnerability to depression has been related to various 
aspects of the self, including low, fragile or vulnerable self-esteem (Kohut & Wolf, 1978; 
Mollon & Parry, 1984), problems with self-efficacy (Maddux & Meier, 1995), self-
consistency (Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky, 1993), self-derogation (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1987), self-criticism or self-critical perfectionism (Blatt, 2004), self-silencing (Jack, 1991), 
self-focused attention (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), and the development of a false self 
(Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Research on narcissism (a concept emerging from the psychoanalytic 
tradition that refers to the development of feelings of self-esteem and self-worth) is also 
relevant here, as theories rooted in this tradition have argued that vulnerability for depression 
is associated with disruptions in the development of narcissism, leading to a defensively 
grandiose but vulnerable or false self (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut & Wolf, 1978; Pincus, Cain, & 
Wright, 2014). Depression has also been linked to discrepancies between the ideal, wished for 
or “ought” and the actual or real self (Higgins, 1987). Similarly, ego psychological theories of 
depression, albeit using the more abstract notion of ego instead of the more experience-near 
concept of self, have focused on discrepancies between the ego and the superego or ego ideal 
(internalized “ought” or ideal self-aspects) in explaining vulnerability for depression (Bibring, 
1953; Jacobson, 1971). Also, various authors have linked self-conscious emotions such as 
shame and guilt to depression (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011). Finally, many theories 
have focused on impairments in representations or cognitive schemas of self-in-relation-to-
others as vulnerability factors for depression (Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Beck, 1983; Blatt, 
2004; Bowlby, 1973).  
The list of theories linking aspects of the self to vulnerability depression is long. This 
should not be surprising. Indeed, the phenomenology of depression suggests that depression is 
associated with an often serious disruption of the feeling of self and self-experience (see 
Figure 1). Depression is associated with a range of subjective experiences that seriously 
threaten the coherence of the self: feelings of sadness, guilt, shame, helplessness, 
hopelessness, and despair disrupt the continuity of the self and are felt as extremely painful 
and inescapable, to the point that the depressed individual may have the feeling that he/she 
can no longer bear the psychological pain associated with these subjective states.  
We begin this chapter with an attempt at conceptual clarification based on 
contemporary developmental theory and neuroscience. Next, we discuss an integrative 
dialectic model of the development of the self that has its roots in the delineation of two 
qualitative different types of self-experience in depression, which has led to a productive 
program of research on vulnerability for depression. We also discuss links between this 
approach and other theories about the self in depression. We then go on to discuss more recent 
approaches that focus on the self as a process, and on disruptions in this process that are 
associated with depression. For each of these approaches, we discuss implications for 
treatment. Finally, we also discuss neurobiological accounts of the self in relation to 
depression. 
What is the self? 
Many theories referring to the role of the self in depression typically use metaphors (such as a 
“fragile self”, or discrepancies between the ideal or wished for self and the actual self) to 
capture the psychological processes that may explain vulnerability for depression. These 
metaphors are tremendously helpful from a phenomenological perspective but also have led to 
the reification of these self-experiences, as if we truly “have” a false or fragile self, or that we 
“have” an ideal and an actual self. Although helpful clinically, they provide a metaphorical 
description of the phenomenological experience of depression, rather than a true explanation 
(see Figure 1). Most contemporary psychological approaches therefore assume that the self 
and the sense of self-coherence (i.e., the sense that one has continuity and consistency in 
thought and behavior) is an illusion (Bargh, 2011, 2014): it is the product of our capacity for 
social cognition or mentalizing, that is, our capacity to understand ourselves in terms of 
intentional mental states (i.e., our feelings, wishes, attitudes, and goals) that have some 
stability over time (Han, Northoff, & Joan, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006).  
In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the differences between theories about 
the self in depression that are rooted in mental representation versus mental process 
approaches to the self. While the former typically focus on the content of representations of 
the self, the latter approaches view impairments in self-structures in depression as being the 
result of impairments in the process of social cognition or mentalizing (Fonagy, Edgcumbe, 
Moran, Kennedy, & Target, 1993; Luyten, Blatt, & Fonagy, 2013).  
 
Mental representations models of the self in depression: depression and disruptions of 
the dialectic between the development of the self and relatedness 
Both psychodynamic (Blatt, 2004; Luyten & Blatt, 2012) and cognitive-behavioral 
(Beck, 1983; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003) theorists have argued that distortions in the 
content of mental representations concerning the self (and others) confer vulnerability to 
depression (see Table 1). Beck (1983) described the concepts of sociotropy and autonomy, 
which refer to broad cognitive-affective schemas that organize the self and are presumed to 
confer vulnerability to depression, as well as to other types of psychopathology. These 
dimensions overlap both theoretically and empirically with psychodynamic formulations 
concerning dependency and self-critical perfectionism respectively (Blatt, 2004; Luyten & 
Blatt, 2011, 2013b). While sociotropy/dependency refer to a self-organization that is overly 
focused on others as a source of self-worth and self-esteem, autonomy/self-critical 
perfectionism refers to a sense of self that is overly focused on achievement and autonomy at 
the cost of developing a capacity for relatedness. These types of self-organization are 
considered to reflect a disruption of the normal dialectical interaction between two 
fundamental developmental lines. These are, first, an anaclitic, relatedness or attachment line, 
which normally leads to increasingly mature, complex, and mutually satisfying interpersonal 
relations; and secondly, an introjective or self-definitional line, which normally leads to the 
development of a stable, realistic, and essentially positive self and identity (Luyten & Blatt, 
2013a; Luyten et al., 2011a). Disruptions in this dialectic lead to an imbalance between these 
developmental lines, in which one is overemphasized or exaggerated while the other is 
neglected.  
Empirical research suggests that autonomy/self-critical perfectionism involves one’s 
identification with high demands from attachment figures and/or represents a defensive 
compensation for feelings of inferiority resulting from harsh parenting – in particular parental 
criticism and psychological control (Blatt & Luyten, 2009; Soenens, Vansteenkiste, & Luyten, 
2010). Attempts to compensate for these feelings may lead to overcompensation, as is 
expressed in an exaggerated focus on achievement, often leading to mental and/or physical 
overexertion, and a so-called “false” self that is seen as strong, autonomous and self-reliant, 
but in reality is fragile and vulnerable. These individuals have been described in the self 
psychology literature as experiencing a strong discrepancy between their “ought” or “ideal” 
self and their real self, or as characterized by strong conflicts between their ego ideal and/or 
superego and their ego, or as exhibiting high levels of self-criticism and self-derogation, 
depending on the specific theoretical approach. Excessive self-sacrificing tendencies may 
serve the purpose of seeking recognition and praise. Given this tendency for overexertion and 
self-sacrifice in combination with strong needs for autonomy and control, self-critical 
perfectionism is also implicated in fatigue- and pain-related exhaustion syndromes (see 
Chapter XX in this book), as well as in eating disorders (Boone, Soenens, & Luyten, 2014; 
Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011). 
Sociotropy/dependency refers to a self-organization that is overly focused on others as 
a source of self-esteem and self-worth, to the neglect of feelings of autonomy. This may range 
from individuals with a very fragile “self-structure” who thus are almost completely 
dependent on others for their self-esteem; this is, for instance, typically observed in 
individuals with borderline personality disorder. Indeed, studies suggest the existence of high 
levels of preoccupied and disorganized attachment in these individuals, which lead to 
idealization–denigration cycles in relationships and a lack of feelings of stability of the self – 
so-called identity diffusion (Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Levy, Beeney, & Temes, 2011). In 
higher functioning individuals (e.g., individuals with dependent or histrionic personality 
disorder), dependency needs are more modulated and are typically associated with a 
submissive yet passive-aggressive relational style. These individuals typically inhibit anger as 
“anger threatens the very hand that feeds” (Blatt, 2004), which often is associated with “self-
silencing” strategies (Jack & Dill, 1992), silencing their needs for autonomy and recognition 
because they fear abandonment and loneliness. Many of these individuals may also develop 
compulsive caregiving tendencies; that is, they care for others as they would like to be cared 
for themselves (Blatt, 2004). Developmentally, excessive dependency has been shown to be 
rooted in attachment figures’ excessive emphasis on dependency, i.e., feelings of love, 
approval and recognition were excessively contingent upon the child’s dependence, thwarting 
the development of the capacity for autonomy and self-efficacy. 
Sociotropy/dependency and autonomy/self-critical perfectionism have also been 
shown to be associated with increased stress sensitivity and stress generation processes, 
particularly through their impact on close interpersonal relationships, which are expressed in 
dysfunctional interpersonal transactional styles (Luyten, Blatt, Van Houdenhove, & 
Corveleyn, 2006; Luyten et al., 2011b; Shahar & Priel, 2003). Highly dependent individuals 
tend to elicit rejection and abandonment by others because of excessive demands for love and 
care. They thus show hypervigilance for rejection and abandonment, leading to continuous 
doubts about the self, which hampers the development of feelings of autonomy, integrity and 
agency. Self-critical perfectionistic individuals tend to evoke criticism and disapproval in 
others as a consequence of their high standards and critical attitudes. Hence, others tend to 
confirm dependent individuals’ fears of rejection and abandonment, and self-critical 
individuals’ fears of disapproval, leading to vicious interpersonal cycles. Self-critical 
individuals therefore show hypervigilance for experiences of failure, typically leading to 
strong feelings of self-doubt and often even the conviction that, deep down inside, they are 
completely worthless. Needless to say, these feelings and fantasies seriously hinder the 
development of positive feelings of self-regard. These findings are in line with major models 
of depression linking the disorder to increased stress sensitivity and the active generation of 
stress (Hammen, 2005; Heim, Newport, Mletzko, Miller, & Nemeroff, 2008).  
Despite these similarities in various theoretical formulations concerning these two 
types of self-organization in depression, there are also some interesting differences between 
theoretical orientations. For instance, there is a greater emphasis on the function of these types 
of self-construal within psychodynamic approaches. As an example, cognitive-affective 
schemas centered on sociotropy/dependency are not seen solely as reflecting an individual’s 
high dependency needs resulting from a history of deprivation, but also as his/her best 
attempt, given his/her biological endowment and environmental context, to establish some 
sense of stability in the sense of self and others – however maladaptive the attempt may in 
fact be. This perspective has recently also been incorporated in schema therapy – for example, 
through the notion of experiential avoidance and the view that schemas (and modes) may 
reflect compensatory strategies (Eurelings-Bontekoe, Luyten, Ijssennagger, van Vreeswijk, & 
Koelen; Young et al., 2003).  
Mentalizing and the self in depression: depression and disruptions in the capacity for 
reflecting about the self 
More recent psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral approaches have increasingly adopted a 
process approach to the disorganization of the self-experience and vulnerability for 
depression. Specifically, there is increasing interest in the role of impairments in 
metacognition – literally “thinking about thinking” – or mentalizing (also referred to as 
reflective functioning) in depression (Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, & Target, 2012; Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2013; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). These approaches center on the 
metacognitive processes that are involved in reflecting on the self and others (see Table 2). 
This approach is consistent with the so-called “third-wave” cognitive-behavioral approaches 
that focus on the roles of metacognitive awareness and mindfulness in the treatment of 
depression.  
These approaches complement views focusing on distorted cognitive-affective 
schemas in depression outlined earlier in this chapter. Specifically, they provide a better 
account of the disintegration of the feeling of self that is typical of many depressed patients 
and which is perhaps at the core of the depressive experience. These more phenomenological 
process-oriented approaches also provide more direct, and perhaps more effective, avenues 
for intervention with patients who are severely depressed: “lifting” these patients’ depressed 
mood is often a prerequisite before they can engage with their therapist in any meaningful 
work relating to the content of their depressive experiences. This may be one of the reasons 
why mindfulness-based cognitive therapy has been shown to be effective in chronic 
depression (Kahl, Winter, & Schweiger, 2012; Mathew, Whitford, Kenny, & Denson, in 
press). Similarly, the mentalizing approach originated in the treatment of patients with 
borderline personality disorder, who commonly experience intense, long-standing feelings of 
depression as well as serious disorganization of the self (Luyten & Fonagy, in press).  
Both mindfulness and mentalizing approaches to depression place emphasis on the 
influence of depressed mood on a person’s metacognitive abilities. These approaches start 
from the point of view that, irrespective of the cause of a person’s low mood and depression, 
they may well be completely unable to reflect on the self and others when they are depressed; 
when he or she does engage in reflective processes, they are very likely to be biased by 
his/her depressive thoughts. Hence, mindfulness and mentalizing approaches tend to avoid 
interventions that rely on insight and reflective capacities, particularly in the early stages of 
treatment, when patients are more likely to be severely depressed and to lack these capacities. 
Such interventions run the risk of the patient experiencing further pessimistic thoughts, for 
example, feeling helpless and hopeless, perceiving the therapist as lacking in empathy – or 
even as persecutory or accusatory – depending on the content of the patient’s cognitive-
affective schemas (that is, whether they tend toward sociotropy/dependency, or 
autonomy/self-critical perfectionism, as outlined earlier). A patient whose self-organization is 
strongly dependent may feel that the therapist fails to recognize his/her suffering or even 
blames the patient for his/her problems. In contrast, a patient who is more self-critical may 
feel that the therapist attempts to force interpretations on them and thwarts the patient’s 
strivings for autonomy; these patients often drop out of treatment prematurely for this reason. 
From the mentalizing perspective, three types of so-called prementalizing modes – 
modes of thinking that antedate full mentalizing – may be observed in individuals with 
depression (Lemma, Target, & Fonagy, 2011a; Luyten et al., 2012). These modes of 
experiencing subjectivity seriously distort the patient’s feeling of coherence of the self, which 
leads to increasing pressure to externalize unintegrated, unmentalized features of the self – a 
feature well known to anyone who has worked with seriously depressed patients. 
In a psychic equivalence mode, inner and outer reality are equated, such that what the 
patient thinks or feels becomes hyper-real for them. For example, if a depressed patient thinks 
he is worthless, it means that he truly is worthless. Any attempt to correct these 
“dysfunctional thoughts” is itself meaningless – particularly when the patient is severely 
depressed – and only serves to reinforce psychic equivalence thinking. Psychic equivalence 
thinking can also lead the patient to equate psychological and physical pain, or emotional and 
physical exhaustion. The general concreteness of these patients’ experiences can mean that 
psychological pain literally feels like bodily pain, and depressive thoughts may feel as if they 
are actually pressing down on the self. This may go some way to explaining the high 
comorbidity between pain, fatigue, and depression (Luyten & Van Houdenhove, 2013). These 
individuals may also perceive negative remarks or criticism from others as a literal attack on 
the integrity of the self, which can lead to feelings of disintegration. This may result in 
hyperembodiment – a state in which all subjective experiences are experienced as too real; 
this often leads the individual into a “psychic retreat” because thoughts and feelings, in 
particular feelings of shame, are literally too painful for the patient to bear (Luyten, Fontaine, 
& Corveleyn, 2002) . The so-called “depressive realism” that some depressed patients show 
also seems to be related to psychic equivalence thinking: while it may be “realistic” in some 
respect, reality simply is what it is, which leads to a sense of meaninglessness and apathy. 
The teleological mode refers to a mode of functioning in which the patient recognizes 
a role for mental states as motivating the actions of the self and others, but this understanding 
is limited to goal-directed behaviors (hence the term “teleological”) that can be directly 
attributed to observable (physical or biological) causes. In this mode, depressed patients may 
only feel loved or recognized when someone demonstrates love or recognition by observable, 
physical means, such as keeping them constant company. These patients may well engage in 
desperate strategies to get their attachment figures – including medical and mental health 
professionals – to show that they care for the patient. This is most notable in more dependent 
patients (e.g., by demanding that a loved one never leaves them alone, or by expecting their 
therapist always to be available for them). Another consequence of thinking in the teleological 
mode is that patients may deny that psychological factors play a role in their depressive 
illness, and steadfastly believe that there is a biological cause, as only biological factors can 
be recognized as real, which is often typical of more self-critical patients.  
Depressed patients often seem to function in an extreme pretend mode, or hypermentalizing 
mode. This may appear on the surface to be genuine mentalizing, just as depressive realism 
may come across as appropriate realism. However, hypermentalizing can be distinguished 
from genuine mentalizing in a number of ways. Hypermentalizing accounts (a) are mostly 
overly analytical and lengthy; (b) are likely to be heavily focused on depressive themes and 
self-conscious emotions in particular (i.e., guilt, shame); (c) are often self-serving (e.g., they 
are constructed to encourage others to show empathy or compassion to the patient, or they 
may even be used to control or coerce others); (d) may lack true affective grounding or, at the 
other extreme, may completely overwhelm the patient and others affectively. In addition, (e) 
the patient may show an inability to “switch perspectives” (e.g, from a focus on the self to 
others) when asked to; in contrast, genuine mentalizing is characterized by the ability to 
consider the mind of others at the same time as the self. Hypermentalizing is thus often 
accompanied by what is called rumination in cognitive-behavioral terms.  
Depressed individuals’ use of prementalizing modes typically gives rise to a pressure 
to externalize alien self-parts, that is, self-experiences that the individual cannot mentalize. As 
previously discussed, the capacity for mentalizing creates a feeling of coherence and stability 
of the self; thus, in an individual whose capacity to mentalize is impaired, this integrative 
process will be weak, and the incoherence in their self-representation is likely to become 
dominant. Torturous feelings of being “bad” or “worthless”, for instance, will come to 
dominate the person’s self-experience. They may deal with these experiences by externalizing 
them – that is, behaving toward others as though the others are responsible for the 
unmentalized self-experiences, and sometimes even generating the same experiences in others 
– that is, others then tend to engage in the same punitive or persecutory behaviors that the 
person internally inflicts upon themself (Fonagy & Target, 2000). Some patients instead 
engage in substance abuse, excessive eating or fasting, or other types of behavior that (in the 
teleological mode) temporarily relieve their tension and arousal (Fonagy & Target, 2000). 
Hence, the disintegration of the experience of coherence of the self because of the failure of 
mentalizing that is a result of depressed feelings appears to play an important role in 
explaining the association between depression and suicidal behaviors (Luyten et al., 2013). 
Implications for intervention 
 
All major therapies for depression focus on the experience of the self in depression. 
More traditional approaches, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, psychodynamic 
psychotherapies, interpersonal therapy and emotion focused therapy, focus on the content of 
self-experiences and self-organization that are presumed to confer vulnerability to depression. 
More recent approaches, as we have seen, also focus on the process of generation of a 
coherent self-experience and how this process is disrupted in depression. Increasingly, 
clinicians are integrating both perspectives; this approach is exemplified by dynamic 
interpersonal therapy (DIT) for depression, an integrative psychodynamic treatment that has 
recently been developed in the United Kingdom (Lemma et al., 2011a; Lemma, Target, & 
Fonagy, 2011b). DIT has a content focus, the so-called interpersonal affective focus, which 
looks at the patient’s typical recurring self-in-relation-to-others patterns. It also has a clear 
process focus, aimed at improving mentalizing capacities.  
Changes in the capacity to reflect upon and make sense of one’s own experiences may 
be the common factor that explains the effects of all evidence-based forms of psychosocial 
treatment; improvements in this capacity will help to restore the coherence of the self and 
facilitate the development of “broaden and build” cycles (Fredrickson, 2001) that allow a 
reorganization of the patient’s self-experience. While different treatments may focus on the 
capacity to mentalize in different ways, they have a common outcome in process terms.  
Traditional cognitive-behavioral approaches may promote mentalizing via drawing the 
patient’s attention to his/her automatic thoughts and unhelpful attitudes, which may provide a 
new perspective on the self (Bjorgvinsson & Hart, 2006). Mindfulness-based approaches may 
foster mentalizing about inner mental states in particular, and on how inner mental states 
affect how the individual perceives and interprets the world around them, including their 
social relationships.  
Interpersonal psychotherapy fosters mentalizing with regard to the self-in-relation-to-
others, because of its focus on interpersonal relationships (Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville, 
& Chevron, 1984). The use in traditional psychodynamic treatments of clarification, 
confrontation, and interpretation, and the examination of maladaptive representations of the 
self and others in the context of the therapeutic relationship (Leichsenring & Leibing, 2007), 
is also likely to foster mentalizing. Experiential therapies, which focus on the patient’s affect 
states in the here-and-now within the context of an empathic and understanding therapeutic 
alliance, may, equally, foster mentalizing. For example, Greenberg, Watson, and Goldman’s 
(Greenberg, Watson, & Goldman, 1998) emotion-focused therapy for depression, which 
focuses on empathic understanding and experiential processing of core emotion-linked 
“depressogenic” schemas, is likely to promote mentalizing. 
 
Neurobiology of the self in depression: the disruption of the self as an emergent 
structure 
The focus on the self in theories of depression also provides links with the field of 
affective neuroscience. Congruent with the interpersonal, dialectic view of the self as a 
construct that results from the capacity of mentalizing, neurobiological studies suggest the 
existence of considerable overlap between the neural circuits involved in reflecting on the self 
and those that subserve the capacity to mentalize (Lieberman, 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010). 
Impairments in these neural circuits, including those in the medial prefrontal cortex, 
amygdala, hippocampus and ventromedial parts of the basal ganglia (Drevets, Price, & Furey, 
2008; Johnson, Nolen-Hoeksema, Mitchell, & Levin, 2009; Savitz & Drevets, 2009), have 
been found to be associated with depression (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten et al., 2009). 
These dysfunctions have been linked to the failure of top-down regulation and/or impairments 
in bottom-up input as a consequence of hypersensitivity of limbic structures, which may 
underlie the changes in autonomic regulation, emotion regulation, and neuroendocrine stress 
responses typically observed in individuals with depression (Drevets et al., 2008; Johnson et 
al., 2009; Savitz & Drevets, 2009). These findings suggest that depression is characterized by 
an inability to reappraise and suppress negative affect. To use our terminology, this represents 
a failure of controlled mentalizing, which leads to automatic, affect-dominated mentalizing 
becoming dominant. This model may partly explain the characteristic biased, non-reflective 
assumptions about the self (and others) as well as the emergence of pre-mentalizing modes 
that are commonly shown by people with depression.  
Although further studies are needed to provide more evidence regarding the neural 
substrates of depression, the findings to date are consistent with the view that depression is 
associated with a severe disruption of the experience of self, leading to an increasing focus on 
self-related thoughts and feelings.  
 
Conclusions 
Many theories in psychology and psychiatry have linked features of the self and 
disruptions in self-experience to depression. This chapter has outlined two general 
approaches. The first of these approaches focuses on content distinguishing between two 
types of self-organization – one around issues of dependency, the other around self-criticism. 
The second approach sees the self as an emergent quality or process. The two approaches are 
complementary, and both are in line with current neurobiological understanding of the origins 
of the self. The self is inherently dialectical and its development is intrinsically linked to 
interactions with others. The sense and feeling of coherence of the self depends on the 
capacity for mentalizing. Disruptions in interactions with others, as well as in the capacity to 
mentalize, confer vulnerability for depression – and, unsurprisingly, both of these features are 
related. It is also important to consider the influence of depression on mentalizing and the 
feeling of self: disruptions in the self may thus be both a cause and a consequence of 
depression. These views open up interesting new perspectives for intervention and for 
considerations concerning the role of the self in depression and other types of 
psychopathology more generally. 
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 Figure 1. Self psychological approaches and the phenomenology of depression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Phenomenology of depression 
 Subjective experiences that seriously threaten the coherence of the self 
 Feelings of sadness, guilt, shame, helplessness, hopelessness, and 
despair 
 Felt as extremely painful and inescapable 
Features of the self and theories about vulnerability for depression 
 Low, fragile or vulnerable self-esteem/vulnerable narcissism 
 Development of a false self 
 Problems with: self-efficacy, self-consistency, self-derogation, self-
criticism, self-silencing, self-focused attention, self-consciousness 
 Discrepancies between the ideal, wished for or “ought to be” self and the 
actual or real self, conflicts or discrepancies between ego and superego 
or ego ideal 
 Impairments in representations or cognitive schemas of self and others 
  
Table 1. Mental representation models of depression and the experience of self 
 
 Dimensions of self-experience in depression 
 Self-Critical 
Perfectionism/Autonomy 
Dependency/Sociotropy 
Self-experience Self-experience is overly 
focused on achievement and 
autonomy 
Self-experience is overly 
dependent on others 
Phenomenology of 
depression 
Themes of failure and/or 
defeat dominate: feelings of 
failure, self-hate, guilt, 
anhedonia, and loss of 
interest in others  
Feelings of loss and 
deprivation dominate: 
helplessness, loneliness, and 
concerns about attractiveness 
and/or loveability 
Developmental origins Identification with high 
demands from attachment 
figures and/or the need for a 
defensive compensation for 
feelings of inferiority 
resulting from harsh 
parenting 
Love and acceptance were 
strongly contingent upon the 
child’s dependence on 
attachment figures 
Typical interpersonal 
relationships 
Critical, ambivalent: Tend to 
evoke criticism and 
disapproval in others as a 
consequence of their high 
standards and critical 
attitudes 
Clinging, claiming: Elicit 
rejection and abandonment 
by others because of 
excessive demands for love 
and care  
Therapeutic response Respond primarily to 
interpretative aspects of the 
therapeutic process 
Respond primarily to the 
interpersonal aspects of the 
therapeutic process  
Mutative factor in 
treatment: emergence of 
the neglected and/or 
defended against self-
experiences 
Resolution of ruptures lead 
to recognition of underlying 
dependency needs 
Resolution of ruptures lead 
to greater self-assertiveness 
and autonomy 
   
 
  
Table 2. Mentalizing models of depression and the experience of self 
 
Non-mentalizing modes of experiencing the self (and others) in depression 
Psychic equivalence mode  Inner (mental) reality is equated with outer reality 
(“mind–world isomorphism”), may lead to 
hyperembodiment 
 Intolerance of alternative perspectives, leads to 
“concrete” understanding: “things are what they 
are” (“depressive realism”) 
Teleological mode  Extreme exterior focus: there is only goal-directed 
behavior and real physical causes 
 Observable change or action are experienced as 
the only true indicators of the intentions of the 
other 
Extreme pretend mode  The experience of self (thoughts and feelings) is 
decoupled from external reality 
 Leads to excessive rumination and in the extreme 
may manifest as “dissociation” of thought 
(“hypermentalizing” or “pseudomentalizing”) 
Painful experiences that 
threaten the coherence of the 
self-experience, leading to 
tendency to externalize these 
“alien-self” features 
 The individual feels increasingly unable to bear 
the painfulness of subjective experiences 
 Suicidal thoughts and gestures and/or defensive 
externalization serve the purpose of getting rid of 
painful feelings and restoring the coherence of the 
self 
Therapeutic response  Validation of the patients’ perspective 
 Suggest alternative perspectives (restoring 
mentalizing) 
 Link to current problems in relating to the self and 
others (restoring self-coherence of the self-
experience) 
Mutative factors in treatment Restoring capacity for mentalizing leads to: 
 greater self-coherence and self-efficacy 
 greater capacity for relatedness 
 increased resiliency in the face of adversity 
 restoring the capacity for social learning 
  
 
 
 
 
 
